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Smog
Rides to town
In our little foreign import
Fornicates in the back allies
With the smut
Of city smokestacks
Leaving behind
A I itter of problems for us
Then finds its way aero 5
The sky!

You are yourself
Not any more
The government

has claimed that too

It's an exemption
But not after you signed
Where?
That line right there.
You are your nothing
Take that.
You may as well
You are your nothing
Take that. You may as well.
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Broken branch
Dancing in the wind

What always happens? Why must it happen?
People grow

Just what of life

Together and apart

Have you been fortunate to view

It's not always because they want

But broken now

And yet it seems to be always

I wonder how you took it all

Though we s~ruggle to prolong

So long and lank

And very often, to avoid the obvious

What prangster lobbed you

We only think a lot; we speak a name

From your shank?

But don't dare communicate it

The joyous winter wind?

Unless the same should happen to

Or kin of some two legged kind?

What we have

Were you blind to their approach?

What we used to have

Or could you only cower

What we'd like to have again

'Fore the might which shafted you?
Did it tower over your little frame
Call you by name
Before it did the evil deed?

I think of you; I speak of you

Poor little branch

And yet I feel it happening

Dancing in the winter wind

Despite my dry attempts

What view of death

To make it all seem now

You offer me

When it was yesterday

Still clinging hopelessly onto

Why must it happen?

The tree from which you sprang

People know yesterday

My dying dancing little branch

And grow apart today.

I think of you a lot; I speak your name
And on occasion I write you a letter
In my mind -

I find to put it down

Is either difficult or dull
I cannot spell the things I'd like to say
here aren't enough words, or time to make them
So I forsake them ...
And in the process, only in the process
I seem too, to forsake you

I'm not going to say it again

ADVISOR

..

Cap Com
Digit Digit Beep Voohp
Ma Dot Digit Digit Crunch
Beep
You are the

M digit digit beep beep
A voohp digit digit grunch beep

C digit digit beep digit beep
H digit beep voohp cruch crunch

I am beep digit digit voohp beep
N beep beep crunch voohp digit
E digit digit crunch voohp beep

THE MAN
Beep Digit Digit Digit CRUNCH
AFTER

ALL

DIGIT

DIGIT

BOOM

ah!

[)
i[J ann F~ ra LJ a a Jr.

IIRht r m r h

THE LIGHT. it began with that flare. UNWOMANLY STRENGTH
OF HEART. she wrote that she was the man of the house now.
FOR THE WATCHMAN,
BAD DREAMS. did the kids miss me?
wasn't my pay enough? or worse? FEAR. everything gone to hell.
A HOUSE IN DISORDER. how can she run things? WHAT WAS
THE PREVIOUS REDEMPTION? a home needs a man. RAGE OF
EAGLES, THE FLEDGLINGS DESTROYED. those gook brats,
burning. lATE BUT CERTAIN IS rJHE GODS' REVENGE. not
to my kids. REVENGE ON THE SEDUCER. almost ten years; if
she has a lover ... NO OFFERING WILL ASSUAGE THE ANGER
OF THE GODS. it was for her: three a flier, seven a prisoner.
MORE LIGHT. looking at the flare when we hit. SORROW AND
HOPE, DARKNESS AND LIGHT. but I'm going home, the nightmare is over. TWIN EAGLES DEVOUR THE PREGNANT HARE.
bad dreams still; strafing the hospital. RELIEVE OUR IGNORANCE! I'll never know if we did the right thing. THE CHILD
OF TIME REBELS, BY FORCE HE WINS. we had to be strong,
to fight for everything.
YET THE TERRIBLE SACRIFICE, THE
SAFFRON ROBES STIFFENING WITH BLOOD. you have to pay
a price, nothing gets done unless you pay the price. YOKED TO
THE DEED, HARNESSED TO NECESSITY. I did my duty; what
else. could I do? THIS DAWN, DAUGHTER OF THE DAWN,
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BESETSOUR EYES. I can't believe it was all for nothing. DREAMS
AND RUMORS, A MESSAGE OF FIRE. they say we are criminals,
napalming children. WERE THE ALTARS SMASHED, THE HOUSE
SHALL BURN. soldiers in the temple. and what was their religion
anyway? monkey-gods. AWKWARD AS LOBSTERS IN THE NETS
OF DISASTER, AWAITING THE KNIFE. so many times they could
have killed us, thank God it's too late now. GRAVES DEEP IN
THE ALIEN SOIL THEY HATED AND CONQUERED. but so many
didn't make it; good men rotting in these stinking jungles. LET
ME ATTAIN NO ENVIED WEALTH, LET ME NOT PLUNDER
CITIES, NOR BE TAKEN IN TURN, AND FACE LIFE IN THE
POWER OF ANOTHER. maybe it would have been better to
die. A VOW TO TRAMPLE MANY SPLENDORS DOWN. if only
we hadn't crashed; we could have gone on; we could have won;
I've always wanted another chance. JUSTICE LEADS HIM IN A
CRIMSON PATH. it'll be the red carpet when we get home, we
will have honor. MUST HE GIVE BLOOD FOR GENERATIONS
GONE, DIE FOR THOSE HE SLEW? the wife will be there. she
at least will understand, will forgive. A DREAM THAT STUMBLES IN THE DAYLIGHT. they will all forgive, no one will hate
me, no one will wish that I were dead. I KNOW BY HEART THE
LEGEND OF ANCIENT WICKEDNESS WITHIN THIS HOUSE.I

unbeginnings:
warm and violent touch
currents of shock and substance
this utter, liberate madness;
when precious and petulant patterns break down,
then take, take the smooth velvet sky
and ravish her, dazzle her wide with electric unendings dark touch discordantly rich
beneath whose weight words, those most suspect of gods,
dissemble no longer, no longer,
but shudder to silence; as sparks shock the senses,
as every thing temporal explodes out of time
into exquisite nowness:
as touching is all.

·
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AN INTERVIEW
By Kurt Kroenke

IS MAN a machine? Will scientists someday be able
to control human behavior? Or does man have a free
will, self-determination, the power of choice? Different schools of psychology hold markedly different
views of man. To find out how some of our own
psychologists at Valparaiso University feel, the editors asked Kurt Kroenke to interview Peter Karvellas and
atthew Ikeda, professors in the Department of
Psychology. Dr. Karvellas, whose main interest lies
in physiological psychology, distinguishes himself
rom the behaviorists in certain key areas. He does,
owever, merge with them on the issue of free will.
ikewise, Professor Ikeda, whose main interest lies
n developmental psychology and personality studies,
hough technically not a humanistic nor an existenial psychologist, finds their view of mao more aceptable than the mechanistic view put forth by
ehaviorists.

s a psychologist, what view do you hold of man?

Are you implying that psychology just deals with a
certain part of man, that it doesn't concern itself
with the whole man?

n\.S

I: At this point, psychologists are not quite capable
of dealing with ontological-existential que tion :
man's fear of death, finding meaning and purpo
in
life, the possibility of meaninglessness and emptiness in lif ,
and so forth. Many psychologists are beginning to how interest in these areas, but such interest is still in its infan y.
Eventually, an adequate view of man, even from a psv hoi ical viewpoint, must be kind of a holistic one, the r ult f a
dialogue between psychology and other disciplin ,in ludin
the humanities.

Does man exert any control over his development,
or is growth purely a function of genetic and environmental factors as the behaviorists contend? In other
words, does man have a free will?

K: I'm not really a behaviori t. I think f
b h .
iorist as one who just simply s k t id ntify In
descriptive way the relationship b tw n nrnuli
and responses without regard to intervening pro
ithout regard to the effects the stimuli hav on th
r aniz u n
of the human nervous system. I'm willing a a phy I I gi al
psychologist to talk about orne things b havi ri t
r n t
willing to talk about. I'm willing to talk about I v ,I'm
illin
to talk about compassion, I'm willing to talk about num r
of so-called human value kind of mental tat . Bu I h r
with the behaviorists the vi w that man' b h vi r i tri tl
determined, that man does not mak
hoi
,th t d Ii ration is an illusion, that what man th r for do
I in
it bl ,
that man is not blameabl nor prai abl f r what h d
that his behavior is imply a cons
f
n ti
environmental input.
,

K: It is my view that man's behavior is ultimately
reducible to physical terms. As a physiological psychologist, I work under the fundamental assumption
hat there exists for every psychological event a corresponding
rain state. Thus, under this view, it would seem to follow that
o understand man, to understand the vast array of psvchologial behaviors he is capable of exhibiting, one should look at
he neural correlates of these behaviors. Once these brainehavior correlations have been identified it should then be
ossible to manipulate psychological experience and behavior
y directly manipulating the neural substrates from which they
manate.
,

r:-l
\S

1: I find that question very difficult to answer because
you're aski ng my view as a psychologist. I have to
.
distinguish myself as a psychologist and as a human
eing. As a psychologist I view man in developmental terms,
. an organism that grows from infancy through an entire
Ife c~c1e. This concept of a growing organism, cognitively,
mononeuv, and socially, from early stage to final stage, is
P ychological view. As a human being I look at man in a
p r n e than as a psychologist.

himself. It is a well-known developmental tact that as a mal.
grows from a child to an adolescent, and then to an adult,
he has an increasing awareness of his own choices and a sense
of responsibility for what he chooses. To that extent, man has
a certain degree of self-determination.

The word IIautonomous"
is interesting because.
Skinner. talks about the autonomous man as myth.
What is your response to the concept of an autonomousmanl

~

I: Empirically speaking, I refer man's autonomous
behavior to the choice behavior we exhibit. We have
various choices we can make in life. For instance,
when you come to a university you have a choice of whether
you want to be a psychology major or a biology major or some
other major. Skinner's own daughter chose, after severe identity
crises, to become an artist, not a behaviorist. That choice behavior I'm referring to as the free element, the ego function, in man.

\S

K: By simply saying he chose or she chose does not
,
mean he or she chose ....
Behavior may appear to
be choice on the surface, yet on further analysis it
can be discerned perhaps that the behavior would follow;
it's inevitable given certain historical facts and certain genetic
facts about that person that he would have responded in that
particular way ....
I subscribe to a deterministic point of
view - I don't say it is true, for it hasn't been proven nor do
I think it ever will - simply on a pragmatic basis. It works,
and I find I'm able to study human behavior using the scientific model which is deterministic. And if you compare the
power of this method with any other - yours perhaps you'll have to agree it's a very powerful method indeed, one
that has produced and continues to produce a steady, highquality collection of knowledge about man and about the
world. I acknowledge the fact that science may at the present
be unable to offer a satisfactory explanation of those cognitive psychological phenomena which are of principal concern to your humanistic orientation; however, I believe that
these phenomena are ultimately amenable to scientific analysis and therefore will someday be explained. To push the
panic button at this point and introduce a free will postulate
is, I feel, a bit premature.
~

I: I'm not pressing the panic button. I feel that at
this stage of the game some degree of agnosticism
may be far preferable to a deterministic postulate.
We may not know all about human behavior. It is my belief
that within certain determinants of behavior - environmental
and genetic givens - growth of the organism suggests certain
degrees of freedom, self-determination,
and responsibility
for his life. I do not excuse every irresponsible action with
the determinist notion of antecedents. I think a man has a

\S
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responsibility for his life, and he's aware of his own quality
of life. The issue of morality and ethics becomes a very serious
problem if determinism becomes a world view. Now, a world
view is not supposed to be within the domain ofscience: a
world view is a philosophical enterprise. If you are willing to
say that, not as a scientist, but as a philosopher, you hold to
the world view of a deterministic universe, that's one thing.
But in saying science dictates determinism you have committed a naturalistic fallacy. Naturalism is simply a description
of the facts. If gathering the facts as they exist suggests deterministic lawfulness and you tentatively hold to that, I have
no argument.

Don't you also tentatively order the facts as they
come in to conform with your world viewl Can anyone avoid a -naturalistic fall acyl
I: Yes, everyone easily commits a naturalistic fallacy,
and I only wish every scientist would admit that.

What is your reaction to the description of man as a
machine!

K: I see man as a machine operating in a closed
deterministic system that is sufficiently complex to
offer him a possibility for-change with new experience
and a possibility for growth. Ultimately, however, there is a
limit on these possibilities. That limit is set by the totality of
the organism's environmental and genetic inputs. That a
child' is able to exhibit more intelligent behavior, more adaptive behavior, as he gets older, doesn't necessarily constitute
a problem for the deterministic view ....
There is room for
complex behavioral development and adjustment within the
cybernetic type of mechanical man I envision.
,

r:'.

I: If you use machine as a metaphor I think it's a
very poor metaphor. Here is where I think psychology
should possibly be in conversation with the disciplines of English and other humanities to create a better
metaphor to describe the nature of man. Machine has a closed
system impl ication. The machine aswe know it does not evolve
in any way or expand, but man does. There is a great revolt
against the technological domination in our society, that
man is becoming like a machine: he gets up in the morning,
goes to work, comes home. In view of this revolt against the
machine and a technologically dominated society, the machine model of man, even if used just as a metaphor, is a
highly revolting model.

\S

*A noted behavioralist,

Freedom

and Dignity.

B.F. Skinner

is the author

of Walden

Two and Beyond

What machine also implies is that man can be controlled like a machine, that if we can control all the
complex variables that affect a man we can ultimately predict hls behavior like a machine. He's simply an
ultra-complex machine with so many more inputs.
You said before that it's hard to define autonomous
but I think what that implies is that if you could put
man in the hypothetical situation where you know
all the environmental and genetic inputs affecting
his behavior, and you could control all these inputs,
-you would still not be able to control his behavior.
He could still have one of two possible courses of
action, or three, or four, and you could not' predict
which one he would take.

~

I: Man is a peculiar creature among all others who is
aware. He's aware of his similarity to a machine.
This awareness, this consciousness, of his own
predicament is unique among all creatures. This is the element I think Skinner is not willing to admit into his psychology
- self-awareness. This is what I call an element of spirit or
the autonomous element in a man. It's a well-known empirical
fact that as man becomes more advanced, he becomes less
and less easy to control. The more intelligent a person is, the
more difficult the behavior modification becomes. One of
the reasons is that the person is aware he is being modified,
that he can therefore resist that modification.

\S

Then you say that in man's unique awareness, not
present in any machine or lower animal, lies possibly
his ability to resist control.

N
\S

I: Yes. Man has that capacity. As a scientist I cannot
make this statement, but as a human being I see man
as Homo religiosus; man is the religious man. I'm
not talking about any particular content of religion here, but
I mean that man is capable of ultimate concerns by which he
may transcend the naturalistic control.

from walking to picking up small objects, while the other set
of muscles was thought by most until just recently to be under
involuntary control. Recent research has shown that it is
possible.for human subjects to exert voluntary control over
these so-called involuntary muscles. It is important to point
out here that involuntary muscles are activated by nerve
which are, to a greater or lesser degree, influenced by th
brain. In other words, there exists a mechanism by which th
nervous system can exert control over respiration. heart beat.
and blood pressure. -10 have characterized these mu I a
involuntary was simply a mistake.

Obviously, you don't buy the notion of "mind
matter."

over

K: I can't see the "mind." I can
th b dy, nd
that's all I think there is. I don't know anything b ut
the "mind." I think the brain is abl to x rt
ntr I
over the so-called involuntary mus I . I don't n d t r ort
to any extraphysical explanation of autonomi
nditi ning.
If there were no nerves making conta t with inv lunt r
muscles, and somehow these mu cI
ould b
ntr II d b
-intention. then I would have to think about my n w r, but
there is a mechanism by whi h this ontr I an b
t d.
,

~

I: That's where I have a v ry diffi ult tim
any physiological r du tioni m, th t i , th
intentionality of man. Th hum n bing ina
system; he does things. To r du
thi int ntion litv t
physiological phenomenon i v ry diffi ult f r m t

\S

n n
pt.

How do you, not as a scientist, but as a human bein ,
view or interpret your day-to-day living? As a human
being I'm sure you have existential concerns about
your family, about yourself, about the state of the
world.

As a determinist, unwilling to accept the concept ot
a free will, how do you account for the "mind over
matter" behavior of those who practice yoga: the
ability to slow down one's heartbeat, respiration,
and so forth?
K: You're talking about autonomic
conditioning.
For years there's been a distinction made in psychology textbooks between voluntary and involuntary mu c1es. The idea is that skeletal muscles are under
voluntary control and can be consciously operated to permit
a nerson to make various kinds of motor movements ranging
,

" bte« m , h

n

One thing that especially worries people about the
new scientific psychology is the possibility of Orwell's
1984 or Huxley's Brave New World becoming a reality. The word 1/ control" evokes very negative responses
from most people.

K: Control is not necessarily a bad thing. Once man's
behavior is analyzed in neurophysiological terms,
which I believe will someday happen, it will be possible to correct abnormal psychological behavior simply by
correcting the neurophysiolog.y which mediates that behavior.
So this knowledge can be used to help people; it can be used
toward great social good. On the other it can be very destructive, and in the hands of the wrong people it can enslave man.
The double-edged sword aspect of this type of knowledge is
present potentially in any scientific study of man. Naturally,
there's a certain mental resistance to the idea of control,
but we haven't really said enough about the good applications
,

of it.

Will it ever be feasible to control human behavior!
Behaviorists are often accused of working in the
laboratory rather than in the natural world, and the.
natural world, if not of a different nature than the
lab, is at least so much more complex, especially
when you're working with human beings, that the
variables might almost be of an infinite number.

K: The feasibility of neuro-behavior control techniques is well established. For example, techniques
of electrical and chemical brain stimulation exist
today which when applied to various subcortical brain structures ~ animals can elicit a wide range of highly organized
emotional and motivational behaviors, including hvpersexuality, rage, food-seeking, water-seeking, and many others.
I don't see anything objectionable about working with an animal in a controlled environment as a first step to understandingmore complex behavior. I think it's a more efficient way to
gather information. Hopefully, as one's experimental methods
improve and become more sensitive, one can try to simulate
more and more the natural environment and ultimately be
able to move out of the laboratory and be able to understand
the effects of all these influences on human behavior. I
realize it's artificial, but a certain amount of artificiality is
necessary, and hopefully the artificiality will become less and
less, and the tests situation will become more representative
of nature and therefore more powerful.
,

You talked before about a maturing psychology being able to deal with the full human being. By that
do you mean the incorporation of things into science
we might now see as extrascientifid We talked before about the spirit, or the soul, or things theology

12

now deals with. Do you feel these things should be
incorporated into the scientific approach!

Icl
\S

I: I clearly make a distinction between what is the
domain of psychology as a science and what is the
domain of the humanities. For example, when I
teach in 'the classroom, I operate within the pretty well prescribed domain of psychology. In this domain, I accept contributions made by various fields of psychology, inc! uding a
lot of contributions the behaviorists have made. But I do not
buy scientific reductionism as a human being, which says
all we need to know can be given by science. On the same
token, I object just as vehemently to theologians who say that
all we need to know can be discovered by theology. My view
is that a dialogue of the different disciplines is necessary.
The emerging picture of the science of the future may be a
little more inclusive. At present, we are going through a phase
of almost frightening specialization. But, soon, a phase of
integration of bits of specialized knowledge must come.
Biology, psychology, sociology may be integrated without
losing their .own unique contributions. This more organized,
integrated approach will hopefully be able to deal more and
more with the data we are not capable of dealing with now.
Whether this means science will be victorious and the humanities will be gradually swallowed into psychology or whether
this means humanistic concerns will gradually take over
psychology, it's difficult to say, but my futuristic vision is
that of more cooperation, dialogue, integration, so that some,
of the humanistic concerns we have today will be dealt with
by a more adequate psychology.

}
t
.~
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Nonsense in Understanding
if air were a cushion
then man wouldn't float
if man were an animal
then sunset would be colorless
if colors would be sunless
then man, were he animal
or not
would be airless.
Then one should excite that
which he writes
hears, thinks, does
feels, sees
until the animal in him
seesthe colorless sunset
feels the lung drawn tight from
airlessness
thinks he were floating
and moves into the beyond.
All of which neither of one can
may should would nor wants
to understand.

:. Controversy and strong debate have accompanied the
Issue of abortion from ancient time to the present, but the
recent decision' (January 22, 1973) by the United tate
Supreme Court- .concerning criminal abortion statute ha
certai~ly heighteI!ed debate in many areas of the country.
The high court was well aware of the depth of disagreement
over abortion laws and recognized emotional nature of
the issues involved. The legal aspect is but one small part
of the problem: changing attitudes, advances in m dical
expertise, personal philosophies, experiences, moral
religious beliefs, and serious societal consideration
u h
as population growth, pollution, poverty, sexism and ra _
ism all have their influence upon the issue of abortion.
In spite of these peripheral issues, the nine ju tice mad
it clear from the outset that they were strictly limitin
themselves to a resolution of the main issue "by con titutional measurement free of emotion and of predil ction."
Justice Blackmun, who wrote the majority opinion, furth r
emphasized this stance by quoting from Justic Holm '
dissent inLochner v. New York (1905):
"If the Constitution is made for people of fundamentally differing views, the accident of our findin
certain opinions natural and familiar or novel or
even shocking ought not to conclude our judgm nt
upon the question whether statutes embodyin th m
conflict with the Constitution of the United tat .'
Despite the court's expressed intention to d id
I
constitutional issues in this case, it did take no tic of m dical/legal history to help clarify particular attitud
an
opinions concerning the abortion procedure. H w
statements by opponents of abortion that th
upr m
Court expressly legitimatized murder of "p r on' pr
tected by the Constitution are faulty beau
th
urt
simply did not decide when an embryo or f tu b
"alive" under the law.
II. This case, Roe v. Wade, wa ba ed on a laim that
criminal abortion statutes were uncon tituti nal u t
vagueness and overbreadth. The Texa law wa irnil r t
those in most states, forbidding all abortion
pt th
necessary to save the life of the mother. hus, th pI intiff
(appellant) in this case was faced with thr
h .i : 1) n
abortion; 2) an illegal abortion; or 3) an xp n 1
t- fstate abortion, merely becau e her lif appar ntl
in danger due to the pregnan y. he
nt n.
th
inability to obtain an abortion under afe, 11m I

?

- This article i dealing pecifically with Roe v.
Texas case. We are not referrin
to it
m~a
from Georgia, Doe v. Bolton, which wa d id
same time on slightly different ground.
h
the two cases were e entially the am h w
Itghl r m r "

tions by a licensed, competent physician abridged her right
of personal privacy under the Bill of Rights (specifically
the 1st, 4th, 5th and 9th) and the 14th Amendment.
The right of privacy argument, which is complex, a bit
elusive, and rather new in constitutional law, has been
used such issues as marital intimacy, contraception, procreation, family relationships, child rearing and education. These areas have been deemed to be legitimate zones
of privacy in which state restriction or control must be
severely limited; for personal privacy is an implicit, but
fundamental, right which the courts have extracted from
certain amendments plus a basic concept of personal, ordered liberty.
In this abortion case, the court found that the right of
privacy was "broad enough to erjcompass a woman's de-"
cision whether or not to terminate
her pregnancy."
Blackmun further explained the detrimental effects that
the state's denial of this choice could have upon a woman,
e.g. harmful effects upon her physical and mental health
both before and after giving birth, the problems of unwanted children, the stigma of being an unwed mother.
At the same time, however, the majority emphasized that
this right of privacy is not an absolute right enabling any
pregnant woman to obtain an abortion at any time, any
place, in any manner or for any reason. In other words,
this decision by the Supreme Court did not facilitate
"abortion on demand" as some critics claim. It simply
found that the Texas statute (and those like it) infringed
too severely upon a woman's right to an abortion to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The right of privacy argument is not one-sided, though.
The state's interest in restricting certain personal behavior
must be balanced against individual rights, a common constitutional test which is applied in nearly all cases dealing
with private rights versus state statutory regulations. In
that type of controversy, the state must not only show that
it has an interest in establishing certain restrictions, but
that that interest is "compelling." A strict definition of a
"compelling state interest" is nearly as elusive as a definition
of the right of privacy. In determining the legislative history
and intent behind the Texas abortion statute in order to
understand the nature of that state's interest in restricting
abortions, the court found three commonly advanced
reasons for the enactment of criminal abortion statutes:
First, Blackmun explored the rationale that these laws
were "the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct." No one, including the
representatives of the state of Texas, took this argument
as a serious justification for existing laws. The parties
agreed as well that if this rationale had been the state's
sole purpose for the statue, the law would have been overbroad.
Second, abortion was discussed as a strictly medical procedure. Before the development and general acceptance of
antiseptics, abortion mortality was high. Thus, it was argued
'that a state's concern in enacting anti-abortion statues
was to protect the pregnant woman from an operation that
often proved to be fatal.
The court acknowledged, however, that modern medical
techniques and safeguards have now made the abortion
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procedure relatively risk-free. Blackmun quoted statistiGaldata to show that:
"mortality rates for women undergoing early abortions ... appear to be as low as or lower than the rates
for normal childbirth."
The state does maintain a legitimate interest in the area
of abortion in that, as any other medical procedure, it must
meet high health, surgical, professional and post-operative
care standards. The prevalence of death and disease in socalled abortion mills strengthens rather than weakens thi
state interest in proper care - especially when abortion i
proposed at a late state of pregnancy .
. The third possible reason for a state's interest in abortion
restriction is concerning prenatal life. Some persons argue
that this interest IS justified by the presence of human lif
in the fetus from the moment of conception. The court,
however, recognized that "a legitimate state intere tin thi
area need not stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that
life begins at conception or at some other point prior to
live birth." It merely found that the state may as rt interest beyond the protection of the woman alone 0 long a
at least potential life is involved.
Whether or not these state interests, which can b com
"dominant," are at the same time "compelling" enough to
override personal rights guaranteed by the Constitution i
an entirely different question from that of their exi tn.
Briefly, the court found that the interests propo ed by th
state of Texas were not strong enough to overcom th
rights of the plaintiff/appellant.
Again quoting from th
decision: "In view of all this, we do not agr e that, by
adopting one theory of life, Texas may override th right.
of the pregnant woman that are at stake." Blackmun r p ated, however, that the state does have legitimat and important interests in protecting- the health of th moth, r
and any "potentiality of human life" - and that th
mterests are separate and distinct, growing individ all a
pregnancy progresses.
.
.,
The practical effect of the court' tnme ter holding 1
that 1) a woman and her doctor may de id to t rminat
her pregnancy up until the end of approximat ly thr
months, essentially without restriction;
2) b tw n approximately the third and sixth mont~ ,th tat rna 'pI
reasonable restrictions on the abortion pro dur in n
effort to promote the health of the mother, and 3) It r
"viability", or approximately the ixth month f pr gn n ,
a state may strictly regulate or even ban abortion
t
as a life:or-health-saving ;oce
for th m th, r. I ,th
state may proscribe abortions not don by a II n
h 'sician. Thus, the Texa anti-abortion
tatut an I th
like it were declared uncon titutional in th t th
Ifectuallv proscribed abortion
. The abortion issue has a profound eff ~t
because it deals with relativ ly ba: i lif th on
/ Ith 1 rh
individual mu t adopt a th ory of th . b ginning f h. irna 1\
life in making uch de isions, th ourt ar full, trre I
avoid this is ue.
,
hi
h
From a hi torical tandpoint, on an fl~ I ,ne t l? . I~
disagreement a to wh n lif b gin', R stri t~\'· rrrnm
abortion law in thi countr ar
f vurp I I TI.' I . mt
vintage; yet the cont:ov r y ra ,d
I n. g, 1:1 (' rrn t
of the Per ian Empir .
ordmg t hi t fI
I
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forth in Roe v. Wade, both Greek and Roman law dealt
with the issue of abortion and basically afforded little protection to the unborn. Ancient religion, as well, did not
seem to forbid abortion.
The Hippocratic Oath" and its obviously negative approach toward abortion was also analyzed by the court in
Roe. An analysis of the problem by Dr. Edelstein (The
I-! ippocratic Oath, 1943), as quoted in the beginning of
the opinion reveals the followinz:
The Oath was not uncontested even in Hippocrates
day; only the Pythagorean school of philosophers
frowned upon the related act of suicide. Most Greek
thinkers, on the other hand, commended abortion, at
least prior to viability. See Plato, Republic, V. 461;
Aristotle, Politics, VII. 1335 b 25. For the Pythagoreans, however, it was a matter of dogma. For them
the' embryo was animate from the moment of conception, and abortion meant the destruction of a
living being.
....
.
Edelstein concludes that the anti-abortIOn sentiments within
the Oath represent the views of a small, rigid segment of
Greek opinion, and certainly were not universally accepted.
With the emergence of Christianity, however, agreement
with Pythagorean concepts concerning suicide and abortion became more widespread and accepted. Thus, Dr.
Edelstein suggests that the Oath is "a Pythagorean man~festo and not the expression of a absolute standard of medical conduct."
Justice Blackmun also presented a short historical analysis of common law developments concerning abortion,
(plus the positions of English statutory law, American
law, the American Medical Association, the American
Public Health Association, and the American Bar Assowhich probably give us as clear a picture of the intermingling of legal and moral stances on abortion as any
more recent developments, (plus the positions of English
statutory law, American law, the American Medical Association, the American Public Health Association, and the
American Bar Association.)
Early common law theories seemed to center around the
concept of the "quickening" - the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, usually occurring between the
16th and 18th weeks of pregnancy. An abortion before
quickening was not considered an offense under early
common law. This position was strongly influenced by
theological concepts of when life begins. Most canon law
determined that an embryo or fetus. became a "person"
when it was infused with a "soul", or "animated." Christian
theology eventually fixed the point of animation at 40 days
for a male and 80 days for a female.

·Depending upon the particular translation, the relevant
section is: "I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if
asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect.
Similarly, I will not give to a woman an abortive remedy."
20
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Yet, disagreement continued - and due to various influences, the time of quickening (about 24 to 28 weeks)
ultimately became that point in common law after which
abortion was considered to be a criminal act. Prior to quickening, the fetus was considered to be part of the mother
and thus incapable of being illegally destroyed. This theory
followed the common law throughout England and came to
be accepted in America. Not until after the Civil War did
state legislation begin to replace the common law; and even
with legislation, most states retained a more lenient stance
toward abortions than today. By the end of the 19th century,
Victorian influences increased the degree of punishment
for nearly every type of abortion procedure.
Thus, considering this history and other information,
the Supreme Court stated that it would not resolve the difficult issue of when life begins. Justice Blackmun wrote,
"When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any
concensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development
of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to
the answer."
The court clearly found that an unborn fetus is not a
"person" under the meaning of the 14th Amendment and
consequently not protected as such. To date, there is no
case law in our country holding contrary to the Supreme
Court's statement.
This is not to say, however, that in American law the
fetus has never appeared to hold rights of its own. In most
states, recovery of .damages for prenatal injuries is permissible under tort law (civil as opposed to criminal
"wrongs") if the fetus was viable at the time of the injury.
For example, if a pregnant mother is struck by an automobile and the fetus she is carrying dies, the parents can
sue under wrongful death statutes to recover a money award
for the death. Blackmun dismissed this seeming inconsistency in the law by stating that this type of tort action appears to be aimed at vindicating the rights of the parents,
and that the fetus represents, at most, only "the potentiality
of life."
Similar instances occur in property law as well - e.g.,
an unborn child, represented by a guardian ad lite.m, can
acquire property rights or interests through inheritance or
other such means. Perfection of these rights, however, is
generally contingent upon live birth, thus leading the
court to the conclusion in this case that "the unborn have
never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole
sense."
Many abortion opponants believe that this case has set
a dangerous precedent for a parade of horrors as yet unparalled in our country. Their contention is that the Supreme Court has legitimatized the taking of human life and
will thus be capable of "legalizing" genocide, infanticide,
euthanasia, etc. ad infinitum,
We respectfully
disagree with these arguments, and
further contend that the court's decision in Roe was far
from "sweeping", but indeed quite modest. 'It did not
adopt a stance favoring "abortion on demand;" it did
not label abortions as "good" in a moral sense, but dealt
trictly with constitutional issues presented to it making
I,t<:hl r m r h

necessary, if controversial, distinctions; it did recognize
both individual and state interests in the abortion procedure and merely enabled women in early stages of
pregnancy to choose whether or not to terminate that
pregnancy. This decision was hardly a mandate encouraging abortion; neither did it legitimatize any unwarranted taking of human life.
Politically,
the Burger Court is not known for its
liberalism. Quite the reverse has been true, as a matter
of fact. Thus, the fears that this Supreme Court will begin
to systematically encourage immoral behavior are simply
unfounded;
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Lying toward dead center, and yet not exactly
Especially in summer
When children's laughing voices
Fade like the setting sun into fall.
Happiness is rough - sadness smooth ...
Somewhere in between is fate
Quite decided; but uncertain
Especially in war
When men's suffering voices
Fall no longer to be heard.
Tears are expressions - smiles are too
Somewhere in between, at ease
Our destiny: perfectly calm; yet upsetting
Especially to a baby
Alive and cheerful babies

w

Try to find a meaning in it.
Knowledge is expensive -

ignorance cheap

Somewhere ... costing only time, is fate
Completely plausible and yet uncertain
Capable of growth, development,

and maturity

Conceivably evil, destructive and gross.
Ahead of us is greatness?
Boastfulness is yellow -

humbleness is blue

Somewhere in between are we
Decidedly convinced and yet uncertain
Wisdom comes with years
And years bring rain, snow, sunshine ...
Of what can we be certai n?
Birth is shiny - death is dull. .. somewhere in between is life
Colored pain and joy and always uncertain
especially in a graveyard
Where from one tombstone to the next
Is not only a lifetime, but eternity .
. Man perserveres through time
and yet he is still uncertain
only to know ...
Love is hard and hate is soft ... somewhere in between is fate
Colored gray and uncertain
Especially in winter.
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Love is hard and hate is soft ... somewhere in between is fate
Colored gray and uncertain.
Especially in winter
When melti ng waters flood into spring.
Want is high and need is low ... somewhere in between is fate
Without a height or depth and uncertai n
Especially in spring
When multi-colored trees turn green
And summer comes upon a windy cloud.
Right is right and wrong is left ...
Somewhere in between is fate
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A GLOSS ON THE SENTENCES OF STRIETELMEIER
IN THE DECEMBER issue, John Strietelmeier inaugurated
a Lighter-sponsored
series on the "Christian university" by
plumping down that "it is probably too late to talk about 'the
Christian university' either as a present reality or as a viable
alternative for the future." That is a hard act to follow, especially
if you found his arguments persuasive! (There referred to the
policies of government as well as to dispositions of the "larger
society," church constituencies, and university members themselves.) This member found them unexceptionable - and found
himself no exception.
When someone says it is too late to talk about the Christian
university and goes on talking for four columns, he is either
garrulous or nervous - or prophetic. But Strietelmeier is
neither A nor B; therefore, we must consider C. Prophets do not
limit themselves to what is possible; they tell us we may very well
go to hell with what now seems possible. They demand an "art
of the impossible." Similarly, Strietelmeier went on to utter five
oracles, all of them characteristically paradoxical.
1. Christians at the university will continue to draw at
Word and Supper - in chapel (whether or not campus life still "revolves" around it) and elsewhere for failure to do so is a "failure of nerve." (Old words
as the basis of new judgments.)
2. They will think of themselves as "servants" in some
extra-ordinary sense. (Non-servile servants.)
3. They will "care" for one another in "apostolic" ways.
("Apostolic care" is like stroking one another with
sandpaper.)
4. They will seek an institutional excellence not set or
standardized by other comparable institutions "outliving, outthinking, outdying" them. (They will
"excel" even where few choose to compete.)
5. They will respect individual vocation, which means
the right to define vocations. (Callings may call away
from standardized functions.)
...
During the Middle Ages, when the term "Christian university" was born, every aspiring member cut his eye teeth by probing the sentences of Peter Lombard. Following is a commentary,
in the day of the post-Christian university, on the sentences of
Strietelmeier.
METHOD
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Our procedure recommends itself by reference to classical as
well as Christian traditions. When Cicero Sr. packed off Marcus
Tullius Jr. to college in Athens, he pointed the young man to
some advance reading in the Stoics. This advice seems passing
strange, seeing that Cicero was not himself fond of the Stoics
whom he regarded as dogmatic, impractical, and comparatively
uninventive. A first explanation must be rejected: the old man
was not pointing his son toward something safe and unskeptical, which wouldn't do him any harm.
What Cicero knew, on the basis of his own long practice, is
that strange utterances are likely to bear uncustomary truths
and that propositions which seem most strange are therefor'
likely to prove most productive. All knowledge begins in am
biguity and proceeds toward clarity. To deal only with clarities
even to expand them, is not really to learn anything new at all
(This truism Heidegger repeated in his aphorism that "scienc
does not think") Truth recovered from old and strange source
may prove most revealing and motivating; it can result, usin
Cicero's phrase, in/ides et motus.
This had been a favorite method of the Greeks, whose theorn
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.ing ~ay be shown to, derive from the fables and genealogies of
HesI~d and Hom~r. It became a method of the early modem
- thmk of F~anCls Bacon first resisting, then puzzling, and finally won~~nng over the fact that genuine innovation depend
upon t~adItlon. It has reappeared as a mode of revolutionary
discussion .to~ay as protagonists cite perplexing yet pithy utterances of Eric Hoffer or Malcolm X. But it has been practiced
most eminently by Christians in every age, who customarily
begin by citing ancient scriptures.
Our method suggests itself in a time when extension of ordinary plausibilities points toward destruction.
PACKED
UNSERVILE

WORDS,

SERVANTS,

ABRASIVE

CARING

1. In his first sentence, Strietelmeier assert that a mod rn
Christian community will continue to explore old criptural
words, and to perform old acts with water, bread and win,
v n
in this very different day. It will do so not.becau e th
thing
appear-plausible but because they do not - for that v ry r a on
fresh light may break from them. At this university th 01 gians
do not take it as their task to find sources continuitie , to sh
how wise were old words and deeds by new standard . The
ar
able to make us wise, if at all, only in unexpect d way. "Faith
begins in delight and ends in doctrine," said the lat Ian Ram.
The word "ends" seems ominous and well-cho n.
The Princeton University Catalogue announces that att nd n e
in chapel is "part of any rounded education, helping to produ
rounded men." We are speaking of words and cer moni whi h
are not rounded nor readily fitted in, which help produ
str ngers or pilgrims.
We point explicity to the dislocation produc d by ld w rd
in new settings: "separation" in a time of integration, "discrimination" along side of non-discrimination,
"BI s d ar th p r
along side a war on poverty. Weeven ing or row w ird ord:
in a time of executive take-over, "Tru t not in prin " th
aare but mo-or-tal"; in a time of air pollution, "whil I dr
thi
fleeting breath." Put that beside Profes or Kr k I r's our
Ecology and you mightget both/ides and motus..
.
2. That becomes the key for sq ieczing
v rythm~"
T·J!
out of the Christian "servant". The focus is no long r on felt
needs but on those uncovered by faithful, orp rat r fl eti
Alma Mater may be a servant but she must not b om' a whor '.
Recall how the prophets objected to a ervant I ra I wh paint d
up for every new king that march d through th land, I in~ de "'11
under every green tree and again t ev ry . to~ 0 as n t to b·
passed by. Jeremiah used a very.old jok : th d iff rene I~'hH' -n
the pleasure and the pain is nine month - n a ad mrc .'
3. The same strange content qualifi s s nt n 3 n ' carmg .
"Apostolic" caring, as Stri telmeier term: it, is pat ral of . ~T •
But it does not merely follow along behind th • sh p r P' up
after them; it also kicks the rump. of th ) sh p. It do s ~()t ~ rely hold hands; it prod. It requir
10 king in two di
II.on:
first backwards to prophet and ro s, and th. n . ut v a d \ I h 'I
fresh intention: what we mu t ay and d now IS lik that. I mbers of the university who har a hristian m rno
r
to ask no less of one another.
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The Greeks found a remedy in arts of inquiry which enabled a
student to shape questions, form judgments, and pursue relevant
and valued facts. During the Middle Ages those disciplines became formulated as "liberal arts" which preceded professional
training in architecture, medicine, law, or theology. Because
these "arts" came to seem wordy and impractical, educators in
the Renaissance shifted the meaning of "liberal arts" to that of
subject matter fields and divided those according to historical
periods. A proliferation of subject matters ensued: graduate
students thought of themselves as "adding to the sum of knowledge" in their fields, and then transmitted to undergraduates
the research methodologies which would enable them to do so.
Meanwhile, new capacities for information storage made possible an accumulation of facts whose value depended on not reshaping questions. The result is a "knowledge explosion" entailing for most of us what the logician Jan Lukasiewicz calls "the
ignorance explosion."
There have been attempts to overcome modern "fragmentation" in the university through programs of general education,
usually construed in terms of "distribution requirements," or
through inter-disciplinary
offerings in which representatives
of various departments report work in progress within their
fields. But the modern university has never recovered a "unity"
in the sense that all participants discuss the basic formulation of
problems under consideration, nor a "diversity" in the sense that
underlying assumptions are regularly explosed to criticism and
revision. What has become lost is not only the conception of a
"Christian university" but also any common academic procedure
like that which gave substance to the term "university."
The "scholastic method" is remembered as restrictive and
burdensome; yet that procedure made possible the airing of
many tentative and speculative issues within the university which were not considered dangerous so long as they were submitted to the rigors of disciplined debate. It facilitated discussions leading to revisions of inquiry and focus, not merely of
logistical arrangements, within the university. Therefore progress seemed possible, as John of Salisbury put it, if descendents
learned to stand on the shoulders and not in the faces of their
predecessors.
...
Any modern university must resist pressures toward unity
through imposed conformity. But may it not also resist the mod
ern trend toward increased proliferation accompanied by a
pervasive, uncontested uniformity? A new question of institu
tional vocation is upon ustoday, as Strietelmeier suggests, anc
that question will not be settled by aping glances toward pres
tigious institutions. "The new academic depression" has brough
a previous mode of expansion into question. An issue confront
ing every university is whether it will ask afresh what educatior
should be like in the next decade. That requires something mo«
than predicting future trends in the hope of grab ing new mar
kets while they last. It is rather a matter of deciding which card
to play in helping people shape their future.
Some old cards remain in the hands of any modern universit~
which remembers the tradition of the "Christian university.
To play those cards against the current stream would mean re
sistirig a further proliferation of subject fields on campus, a
well as further training in standardized skills that can be lef
perhaps, to societal institutions that employ them. It woul
Imply, rather, clarifying and developing those disciplines whic
s~ould ch~acterize every man, which help to shape and reshap
every sub]e~t matter, and which underly every special skill.
would reqUIre a development of arts of inquiry which uncOV
pr.?~Jl~p1sfor which present research methodologies may not t
tailor made. Playing these cards would not in itself make a
insti.tu~ion of hig?er learning a "Christian university," but so~
Christian guts might help a university to do so. This gives su
28

stance to Strietelrneier's call for a personal and institutional
excellence that does not pander after short-term futures or
prestigious peers.
5. The final sentence points to the integrity of vocations within the university and, accordingly, outside it. This sentence
carries little weight if performance in either sphere is simply
predetermined. The University seems less able today than formerly to promise its candidates an open sesame to waiting jobs
(dubious and socially divisive benefit in the past). But might it
not, by reasserting authority in its o)Vn vocations, help young
people become reformers of old jobs and formers of new functions when they leave? Recent attention to para-medical, paraegal, and para-clergy functions seems a move in this direction.
renewed sense of vocation may well include a sense of being
'called out" from previously assumed functions.
Educare means "to lead out" not "to fit in." "Truth" is a
icher commodity than the store of facts presently multiplying
in information systems. It becomes a matter of shaping basic
:questions which turn attention toward new sorts of facts and
onnections among facts, toward innovations in research, and
oward creativity with respect to theoretical and social structures.
ursuit of such truth is a high calling, in which the university
ay play a basic role. But the vocation of its students extends
ven further. Truth is a rare commodity, but the supply usually
xceeds the de~and.
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Muse! Shoot up

this stale mind! Crusty cracks
lack a little water (if you've nothing
stronger) for a magnificent
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because there are no flowers left
to pick in the sun-spangled
world of worlds, and everything
is a parasite of that
poor cannibal brain.
(why shouldn't we share each other's infection 7)
Joan Lundgren

